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Re: [ba-unrev-talk] A caveat about democracy ...incl. legal systemcorrupted almost beyond recognition

Thanks, John.    (01)

And now further adding to the complexities of life: Iran is operating a
nuclear facility beyond the limiting specs set by the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty:     (02)

http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/09/iran.nuclear/index.html    (03)

While human minds focus on one thing, i.q. Iraq, other items that ought
be of major concern creep up on us hardly noticed and, therefore, not
considered in our stance w.r.t. the thing we are focusing on. N. Korea
and Iran, as well as Al Quaeda, ought to figure in any consideration of
the Iraq situation. This is beyond the capability of citizens
unfortified by digital augmentation, spiritual preparedness for coping
with problems arising from weighing public wellbeing against personal
wellbeing in situations of extreme stress, and media that report and
help evaluate.    (04)

Re that second point, when people trample on one another trying to
escape from a brawl in a New York club, imagine what we will do against
one another when WMDs hit us. We won't be a band of brothers.    (05)

H.    (06)

On Sun, 2003-03-09 at 19:56, John J. Deneen wrote:
>   Henry,
> Thanks for reminding us about the overall importance of Doug's life-long 
> concerns: a) augmenting the human intellect, b) improving critical 
> thinking, and c) solving urgent complex problems that's impacting humanity.
> E.g.
> Below are two directly related and though-provoking references caveats 
> about democracy which further delineate these problems requiring 
> collective intelligence, collaboration, and challenges at 
> a Societal-scale similar to the type of work undertaken by 
> UnansweredQuestions.org, including pointers to internet links 
> <http://www.unansweredquestions.org/top_11.html> concerning a collective 
> public 9/11 inquiry about the relationships among capitalism, militarism 
> and politics.
> 1) The American legal system has been corrupted almost beyond 
> recognition, and
> 2) Fiction of Law
> In addition,  the following four books recommended by Judge Edith Jones 
> of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, as presented to the 
> Federalist Society of Harvard Law School on February 28.
>         Philip Howard:
>             * The Death of Common Sense
>             * The Collapse of the Common Good, and
>             * The Lost Art of Drawing the Line.
>         Michael Novak:
>             * On Two Wings: Humble Faith and Common Sense.
>       1) The American legal system has been corrupted almost beyond
>       recognition.
>     * The first threat to the rule of law, the judge quoted George
>       Washington who asked in his Farewell Address, "Where is the
>       security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of
>       religious obligation desert the oaths … in courts of justice?"
>     Similarly, asked Jones, how can a system founded on law survive if
>     the administrators of the law daily display their contempt for it?
>     * The second threat to the rule of law comes from government, which
>       is encumbered with agencies that have made the law so complicated
>       that it is difficult to decipher and often contradicts itself.
>     * The third and most comprehensive threat to the rule of law arises
>       from contemporary legal philosophy.
> American Legal System Is Corrupt Beyond Recognition, Judge Tells Harvard 
> Law School 
> <http://www.massnews.com/2003_Editions/3_March/030703_mn_american_legal_system_corrupt.shtml>
>         "The American legal system has been corrupted almost beyond
>         recognition, Judge Edith Jones of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
>         the Fifth Circuit, told the Federalist Society of Harvard Law
>         School on February 28.
>         She said that the question of what is morally right is routinely
>         sacrificed to what is politically expedient. The change has come
>         because legal philosophy has descended to nihilism." ...
>         [ ...] "She said that the business about all of the Founding
>         Fathers being deists is "just wrong," or "way overblown." She
>         says they believed in "faith and reason," and this did not lead
>         to intolerance.
>         "This is not a prescription for intolerance or narrow
>         sectarianism," she continued, "for unalienable rights were given
>         by God to all our fellow citizens. Having lost sight of the
>         moral and religious foundations of the rule of law, we are
>         vulnerable to the destruction of our freedom, our equality
>         before the law and our self-respect. It is my fervent hope that
>         this new century will experience a revival of the original
>         understanding of the rule of law and its roots.
>         "The answer is a recovery of moral principle, the sine qua non
>         of an orderly society. Post 9/11, many events have been
>         clarified. It is hard to remain a moral relativist when your own
>         people are being killed."
>         According to the judge, the first contemporary threat to the
>         rule of law comes from within the legal system itself.
>         Alexis de Tocqueville, author of Democracy in America and one of
>         the first writers to observe the United States from the outside
>         looking-in, "described lawyers as a natural aristocracy in
>         America," Jones told the students. "The intellectual basis of
>         their profession and the study of law based on venerable
>         precedents bred in them habits of order and a taste for
>         formalities and predictability." As Tocqueville saw it, "These
>         qualities enabled attorneys to stand apart from the passions of
>         the majority. Lawyers were respected by the citizens and able to
>         guide them and moderate the public's whims. Lawyers were
>         essential to tempering the potential tyranny of the majority.
>         "The legal aristocracy have shed their professional independence
>         for the temptations and materialism associated with becoming
>         businessmen. Because law has become a self-avowed business,
>         pressure mounts to give clients the advice they want to hear, to
>         pander to the clients' goal through deft manipulation of the
>         law. … While the business mentality produces certain benefits,
>         like occasional competition to charge clients lower fees, other
>         adverse effects include advertising and shameless
>         self-promotion. The legal system has also been wounded by
>         lawyers who themselves no longer respect the rule of law,"
>       2) There is also a second matter: Fiction of Law.
> E.g. Who is a citizen or resident of the United States?
> There are three classes: (1) There is the citizen of one of the several 
> States who is rhetorically a citizen of the United States but isn't 
> technically a citizen of the United States, (2) there is the special 
> class of citizen of the United States created by the Fourteenth 
> Amendment, and (3) there is the citizen of the geographical United 
> States who doesn't fall within the constitutional scheme. For example, 
> in 1917 Congress bestowed blanket citizenship on Puerto Ricans, in 1927 
> Congress bestowed blanket citizenship on Virgin Islands natives, etc. 
> Citizens of insular possessions cannot vote in presidential elections 
> and do not have voting representation in Congress. Whatever their 
> status, it lies outside the Constitution.
> This is the fine line between Acts of Congress applicable in territories 
> and possessions of the United States and laws of the United States 
> applicable in States of the Union. The former are "nonconstitutional" in 
> nature where the latter are promulgated within constitutionally 
> enumerated powers.
> With those qualifications in mind, I believe the following discourse by 
> the "Informer" has considerable merit, particularly with respect to 
> explaining duplicity common in virtually all state and federal courts.
> Well People, It's about time to wake up and smell the coffee. What I am 
> about to give you is nothing but the truth from the courts and laws of 
> the United States. When you know what to look for you will find it in 
> the oddest places. Places that the ordinary man would not expect to find 
> it. Every one talks about government being a corporation as cited in 28 
> USC 3002 (15). Every one complains when taken to court where is the 
> contract. All people argue these contracts, whether implied, adhesion or 
> what ever. So there is a lot in common with all the arguments. Of course 
> when you go into court you most always lose even when bringing in the 
> law, regulations and court cases that you feel supports your position.
> For years now I have been trying to make people understand that 
> citizenship, of what ever government nature, is what sucks you into 
> being a taxpayer, or requiring you to get whatever license is needed to 
> survive and being controlled by government (corporation). How the 
> government operates is by Fiction of Law. A fiction of law is stated 
> from Lectric Law Library on the net as follows:
> The assumption that a certain thing is true, and which gives to a person 
> or thing a quality which is not natural to it, and consequently 
> establishes, a certain disposition, which, without the fiction, would be 
> repugnant to reason and to truth. It is an order of things which does 
> not exist, but which the law prescribes or authorizes. It differs from 
> presumption because it establishes as true, something which is false; 
> whereas presumption supplies the proof of something true.
> The law never feigns what is impossible. Fiction is like art; it 
> imitates nature, but never disfigures it. It aids truth, but it ought 
> never to destroy it. It may well suppose that what was possible, but 
> which does not exist; but it will never feign that what was impossible 
> actually is.
> Fictions were invented by the Roman praetors who, not possessing the 
> power to abrogate the law, were nevertheless willing to derogate from it 
> under the pretense of doing equity. Fiction is the resource of weakness 
> which, in order to obtain its object, assumes as a fact what is known to 
> be contrary to truth: when the legislator desires to accomplish his 
> object, he need not feign, he commands. Fictions of law owe their origin 
> to the legislative usurpations of the bench.
> It is said that every fiction must be framed according to the rules of 
> law, and that every legal fiction must have equity for its object. To 
> prevent their evil effects, they are not allowed to be carried further 
> than the reasons which introduced them necessarily require.
> The law abounds in fictions. That an estate is in abeyance; the doctrine 
> of remitter, by which a party who has been disseised of his freehold and 
> afterwards acquires a defective title, is remitted to his former good 
> title; that one thing done today, is considered as done at a preceding 
> time by the doctrine of relation; that because one thing is proved, 
> another shall be presumed to be true, which is the case in all 
> presumptions; that the heir, executor, and administrator stand by 
> representation in the place of the deceased are all fictions of law. 
> "Our various introduction of John Doe and Richard Roe; our solemn 
> process upon disseisin by Hugh Hunt; our casually losing and finding a 
> ship (which never was in Europe) in the parish of St. Mary Le Bow, in 
> the ward of Cheap; our trying the validity of a will by an imaginary 
> wager of five pounds; our imagining and compassing the king's death, by 
> giving information which may defeat an attack upon an enemy's settlement 
> in the antipodes; our charge of picking a pocket or forging a bill with 
> force and arms; of neglecting to repair a bridge, against the peace of 
> the king, his crown and dignity are circumstances, which, looked at by 
> themselves, would convey an impression of no very favorable nature, with 
> respect to the wisdom of our jurisprudence."
> Now notice that Assumption is the word used to describe how fiction 
> operates. The word presumption is the opposite, see opening paragraph 
> for this sentence "It differs from presumption because it establishes as 
> true, something which is false; whereas presumption supplies the proof 
> of something true."
>     Now lets use this material from Black's 3rd Edition Law book and a 
> case to wit:
> Fiction. Derived from Fictio in Roman Law, a fiction is defined as a 
> false averment on the part of the Plaintiff which the defendant is not 
> allowed to traverse, the object being to give the court jurisdiction. 
> Black's Law Dictionary 3rd Ed. (1969) Pg. 468; In the case of "Willful 
> failure to File," the Plaintiff and court invents the "fiction" that 
> defendant is a "taxpayer", A.K.A. "Person."  Motions and briefs which 
> rely on precepts of law will thereafter be denied or found frivolous. 
> This point was made clear in Roberts v. Commissioner, 176 F 2d 221, 225 
> (9 C.A., 1949)
> Now you know why all your arguments are frivolous. You are a fiction and 
> fictions have no constitutional protection from encroachment on your 
> unalienable rights. What is this fiction that you are? This is a list of 
> words or phrases that describe a fiction, remembering "fiction" is 
> artificial in character, PERSON, RESIDENT, U.S. CITIZEN, STATE CITIZEN, 
> I am using the full case as it is so important, not only for the fact 
> that I am writing on Fiction of Law, but other parameters that I have 
> written long ago and that people pooh-poohed it as ridiculous as it 
> dealt with admiralty. I had showed where both revenue and driving was 
> maritime in nature and almost everyone said I was way off base even 
> though I had shown, through Benedict on Admiralty, that licensing and 
> registering your car was in the nature of maritime. So all revenue 
> situations, Income tax and Driving are in the admiralty jurisdiction 
> because of the maritime nature. That is why the courts will not tell you 
> the nature is maritime and the cause is that you have violated your 
> promise to perform under fiction of law. Now you are going to say, oh no 
> the Informer is going off the deep end again. Well hear these cases out 
> and the Fiction of Law premise. Take off the blinders you have had on so 
> long and use the brain that the Lord gave you. The Lord did say that not 
> all that have eyes to see will see and, therefore, if you do not see you 
> will forever be doomed to the existence you have. I am going to bold, in 
> the case, to show how maritime is used whenever you carry passengers for 
> hire, be it boat, plane, wagon, scooter, rickshaw or car. Do not lose 
> sight of the fact that you are a fiction and have contracted with 
> government when reading this case. Oh by the way go to Find Law and 
> search for Fiction of Law and have a good time reading.
> U.S. Supreme Court
> ARCHAWSKI v. HANIOTI, 350 U.S. 532 (1956)
> 350 U.S. 532
> No. 351.
> Argued March 5, 1956.
> Decided April 9, 1956.
> A libel in admiralty alleged that petitioners paid moneys to respondent 
> for transportation to Europe on respondent's vessel, and that respondent 
> breached the contract by abandonment of the voyage. The libel further 
> alleged that respondent wrongfully appropriated the passage money to his 
> own use and committed other fraudulent acts. Held: The cause of action 
> alleged
> was within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal District Court. Pp. 
> 532-536.
>     (a) The essential character of the libel as a claim for breach of a 
> maritime contract was not altered by the allegations           of   
> wrongfulness and fraud. Pp. 534-535.
>     (b) So long as the claim asserted arises out of a maritime contract, 
> the admiralty court has jurisdiction over it. P. 535.
>     (c)Admiralty has jurisdiction even where a libel reads like 
> indebitatus assumpsit at common law, provided that the unjust enrichment 
> arose out of the breach of a maritime contract. Pp. 535-536.
> 223 F.2d 406, reversed and remanded.
> Harry D. Graham argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
> Israel Convisser argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
> The sole question in the case is whether the cause of action alleged 
> comes within the admiralty jurisdiction of the District Court. The 
> District Court held that this was an action on a maritime contract, 
> within the admiralty jurisdiction, 129 F. Supp. 410. The Court of 
> Appeals reversed, holding that the suit was in the nature of the [350 
> U.S. 532, 533] old common law indebitatus assumpsit for money had and 
> received, based upon the wrongful withholding of money. 223
> F.2d 406. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we 
> granted, 350 U.S. 872, because of the seeming conflict of that ruling 
> with Krauss Bros. Co. v. Dimon S. S. Corp., 290 U.S. 117, 124.1
> The libel alleges that respondent, doing business in his own and in 
> various trade names, owned and controlled a passenger vessel, known as 
> the City of Athens, and held out that vessel as a common carrier of 
> passengers for hire, and that petitioners paid moneys for passage upon 
> the vessel, scheduled for July 15, 1947, to Europe. A contract for the 
> transportation of passengers is a maritime contract within admiralty 
> jurisdiction.2 The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411. The allegations so far 
> mentioned are plainly sufficient to establish such a contract. The libel 
> goes on to allege a breach of that contract through an abandonment of 
> the voyage. If this were all, it would be plain that petitioners stated 
> a claim for breach of a maritime contract. But the libel further alleges 
> that the sums paid by petitioners as passage money were "wrongfully and
> deliberately" applied by respondent to his own use and benefit "in 
> reckless disregard of his obligations to refund [350 U.S. 532, 534] the 
> same" and that respondent "has secreted himself away and manipulated his 
> assets . . . for the purpose of defrauding" petitioners. Then follow 
> allegations of certain fraudulent acts and transactions.
> The allegations of wrongfulness and fraud do not alter the essential 
> character of the libel. For the ancient admiralty teaching is that, "The 
> rules of pleading in the admiralty are exceedingly simple and free from 
> technical requirements." Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Vance, 19 How. 162, 
> 171-172. And see 2 Benedict, American Admiralty (6th ed. 1940), 223, 
> 237. Though these particular allegations of the libel sound in fraud or 
> in the wrongful withholding of moneys, it is plain in the context that 
> the obligation to pay the moneys arose because of a breach of the 
> contract to transport passengers. Lawyers speak of the obligation in 
> terms of indebitatus assumpsit, a concept whose tortuous development 
> gave expression to "the ethical character of the law." See Ames. The 
> History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 53, 58 (1888). As Mr. Justice 
> Holmes once put it, "An obligation to pay money generally is enforced by 
> an action of assumpsit and to that extent is referred to a contract even 
> though it be one existing only by fiction of law." Thomas v. 
> Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 235.
> The fiction sometimes distorted the law. A line of authorities emerged 
> to the effect that admiralty had no jurisdiction to grant relief in such 
> cases "because the implied promise to repay the moneys which cannot in 
> good conscience be retained - necessary to support the action for money 
> had and received - is not a maritime contract."3 United Transp. & L. Co. 
> v. New York
> & B. T. Line, 185 F. 386, 391. Yet that duty to pay is often referable, 
> [350 U.S. 532, 535] as here, to the breach of a maritime contract. As 
> Mr. Justice Stone said in Krauss Bros. Co. v. Dimon S. S. Corp., supra, 
> at 124:
> ". . . Even under the common law form of action for money had and 
> received there could be no recovery without proof of the breach of the 
> contract involved in demanding the payment, and the basis of recovery 
> there, as in admiralty, is the violation of some term of the contract of 
> affreightment, whether by failure to carry or by exaction of freight 
> which the contract did not authorize."
> The truth is that in a case such as the present one there is neither an 
> actual promise to repay the passage moneys nor a second contract. The 
> problem is to prevent unjust enrichment from a maritime contract. See 
> Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty, 43 Yale L. J. 1. 27 
> (1933). A court that prevents a maritime contract from being exploited 
> in that way does not
> reach beyond the domain of maritime affairs. We conclude that, so long 
> as the claim asserted arises out of a maritime contract, the admiralty 
> court has jurisdiction over it.
> The philosophy of indebitatus assumpsit is, indeed, not wholly foreign 
> to admiralty. Analogous conceptions of rights based on quasi-contract 
> are found in admiralty. One who saves property at sea has the right to 
> an award of salvage, regardless of any agreement between him and the 
> owner. See Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch 240, 266; The Sabine, 101 
> U.S. 384, 390; 1 Benedict, supra, 117 et seq. Likewise, where cargo is 
> jettisoned, the owner becomes entitled to a contribution in general 
> average from the owners of other cargo which was saved without the aid 
> of any agreement. See Barnard v. Adams, 10 How. 270, 303-304; Star of 
> Hope, 9 Wall. 203, 228-230; 1 Benedict, supra, 98. Other examples could 
> be given. See Chandler, Quasi Contractual Relief [350 U.S. 532, 536] in 
> Admiralty, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 23 (1928). Rights which admiralty recognizes 
> as serving the ends of justice are often indistinguishable from ordinary 
> quasi-contractual rights created to prevent unjust enrichment. How far 
> the concept of quasi-contracts may be applied in admiralty it is 
> unnecessary to decide. It is sufficient this day to hold that admiralty 
> has jurisdiction, even where the libel reads like indebitatus assumpsit 
> at common law, provided that the unjust enrichment arose as a result of 
> the breach of a maritime contract. Such is the case here.
> The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of 
> Appeals for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
> Reversed and remanded.
> Footnotes
> [Footnote 1] There is also an apparent conflict with Sword Line v. 
> United States, 228 F.2d 344, 346, decided, after we granted certiorari, 
> by a different panel of the Second Circuit from the one which sat in the 
> instant case.
> [Footnote 2] The Court in New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. 
> Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 392, stated that in determining admiralty 
> jurisdiction the inquiry is "into the nature and subject-matter of the 
> contract, - whether it was a maritime contract, and the service a 
> maritime service, to be performed upon the sea, or upon waters within 
> the ebb and flow of the
> tide. And, again, whether the service was to be substantially performed 
> upon the sea, or tide-waters, although it had commenced and had 
> terminated beyond the reach of the tide; if it was, then jurisdiction 
> has always been maintained."
> [Footnote 3] And see Israel v. Moore & McCormack Co., 295 F. 919; Home 
> Ins. Co. v. Merchants' Transp. Co., 16 F.2d 372; Silva v. Bankers 
> Commercial Corp., 163 F.2d 602. [350 U.S. 532, 537]
> The following is the case cited above that bears importance on the 
> fiction and how you are compelled to pay an income tax for your contract 
> with the government. It is based on a level of a dollar amount which is 
> the possession and use of a federal Reserve Note which is a debt you had 
> and received in a transfer to which you are to pay back a portion for 
> the use of the notes. This is based on the promise to follow all the 
> rules and regs as a citizen of, resident therein of the contract, by 
> implied consent for accepting the artificial character of individual, 
> which is a word definition defining person in statute that is the 
> subject of liability. When reading the following replace 
> "stockholder"/"members" with citizen/person/ resident and "corporation" 
> with State or United States.
> Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 235.
> There remains only the question whether the liability is of a kind that 
> will be enforced outside of the California courts. Analysis on this 
> point often is blurred by the vague statement that the liability is 
> 'contractual.' An obligation to pay money generally is enforced by an 
> action of assumpsit, and to that extent is referred to a contract, even 
> though it be one existing only by fiction of law. But such obligations 
> when imposed upon the members of a corporation may very very largely. 
> The incorporation may create a chartered partnership the members of 
> which are primary contractors, or it may go no farther than to impose a 
> penalty; or again, it may create a secondary remedy for a debt treated 
> as that of the corporation alone, like the right to attach the 
> corporation's real estate; or the liability may be inseparable from the 
> local procedure; or the law may be so ambiguous as to leave it doubtful 
> whether the liability is matter of remedy, and local, or creates a 
> contract on the part of the members that will go with them wherever they 
> are found McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 161 49 L. ed. 702, 705, 25 
> Sup. Ct. Rep. 410, 3 Ann. Cas. 500; Christopher v. Norvell, 201 U.S. 
> 216, 225, 226 S., 50 L. ed. 732, 736, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, 5 Ann. Cas. 
> 740. In the present case we think that there can be no doubt of the 
> meaning of the California statute. It reads: 'Each stockholder of a 
> corporation is individually and personally liable for such proportion of 
> its debts and liabilities,' etc., as we have stated, and supposes the 
> action against him to be brought 'upon such debt.' Civil Code, 322. This 
> means that by force of the statute, if the corporation incurs a debt 
> within the juris- [232 U.S. 221, 236] diction, the stockholder is a 
> party to it, and joins in the contract in the proportion of his shares.
> Now, I hope you are ready to understand what you have read. All statutes 
> are written for persons, residents, individuals and are premised on one 
> thing, citizenship. Citizenship means you are a member of the corporate 
> body politic of the state or federal government. So go ahead and call 
> yourself a citizen of so and so state and you immediately become a 
> "stockholder" of that State and assume all its debts. Plus the fact that 
> the State you claim citizenship in is a "political subdivision" of the 
> United States. Since all States are corporations and have joined the 
> parent corporation, The United States, you are bound to a contract as 
> stated in the cases above. Now you have ASSUMED the character of a 
> FICTION OF LAW, namely that of a person, to which all statutes apply. 
> Now in the definition of person the word INDIVIDUAL describes person in 
> 26 USC 7701 (a) (1). In my books, The New History of America and Which 
> One Are You. I used two cases wherein the Judges stated that the 
> defendants did not dispute that they were NOT United States citizens so 
> they were taxpayers. Why people did not pick up on this is because there 
> is very little logical thinking minds anymore to deduce the obvious.
> Here is how you become part of a contract, that all talk about existing, 
> but no one can figure out where this contract is, to promise to pay the 
> debt of the State and United States. As the above cases states, it is 
> where ever the person (stockholder/member) is that the jurisdiction 
> follows. That is why the IRS can go into a State contrary to what you 
> all believe that they can not. Oh yes they can, and you did it to 
> yourself when using a fiction of law and they came right back on that 
> fiction of law and nailed you with your own actions which you cannot 
> shake no matter how hard you try. They even went to Mexico to get the 
> person, and when you now read Cook v Tate, it will become so clear that 
> you will wonder why you did not see it before. You did not see it before 
> because you did not have this information before you to digest.
> Here is how they did it and looking back to the cases above it should be 
> evident to you.
> You are born a MAN, not a person, or individual. God created MAN. Did 
> God create person, individual or citizen? No statutes are written with 
> Man in them, only person. For only artificial entities can go after 
> other artificial entities, they cannot attack MAN. Read "PERSON" article 
> written on www.atgpress.com/ <http://www.atgpress.com/> for further 
> clarification. The constitution is for members only, the States, not 
> people. People cannot join the Union. To prove it try to join the Union. 
> States are corporations. People, MAN, can become a member of a State by 
> registering to vote or taking an oath to support that contract called a 
> constitution. Once doing that you are a stockholder and therefore a 
> citizen of that state. Citizen is an artificial character and a Fiction 
> of Law. The statutes of contract are geared toward person which is 
> artificial in character. Now that you have claimed citizenship of a 
> State, you are deemed by the Courts as a person of artificial character. 
> Artificial characters have no constitutional protections and are in the 
> same class as other artificial entities (corporations). To prove this 
> look at the words that define person in 26 U.S.C. 7701 (a) (1) which are 
> individual, corporation, association, partnership, trust, estate, and 
> company, all being artificial entities. Being this is so,your part of 
> the debt of the government is predicated on the membership (read in the 
> case above), wherever you might be. The debt the State has to the United 
> States, as a Union member, is transferred to all its members to pay a 
> federal income tax. So it matters not where you are the IRS can go into 
> the state, any state, and has jurisdiction because you are a "person" 
> described in the statutes who is resident in their political 
> subdivision, the state.
> So you are taken into court and claim that you are a sovereign citizen. 
> Remember "citizen" is an artificial entity, a Fiction of Law. "Citizen" 
> is not natural. So the court notes you, by your own admission, are a 
> "member" of the body politic and proceeds on that Fiction of Law. You 
> argue you are not the person liable because the statutes do not define 
> the activity that makes you liable. The fact of the matter is, is that 
> you are the "person" in the statute and the taxpayer in 7701 (a) (14). 
> The person is what makes you liable, not so much the activity. So as was 
> posted in the Cooper case on the internet, that everyone wants to 
> believe that the use of the post office makes for dual citizenship is 
> totally wrong. Dual citizenship is predicated on the fact you are a 
> "member" of a political subdivision (State)of the United States, ergo 
> have dual citizenship for taxation as you are responsible for the debts 
> of both corporations, the State and the United States. So you are an 
> "individual" required to file an individual income tax form. I include 
> an excerpt from The New History of America that proves the point.
> U.S. v Slater, 82-2 USTC 9571
> "There is a tax imposed, in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 1, on the income of `every 
> individual.' No provision exists in the tax code exempting from taxation 
> persons who, like Slater, characterize themselves as somehow standing 
> apart from the American polity, and the defendant cites no authority 
> supporting his position. Slater's protestations to the effect that he 
> derives no benefit from the United States government have no bearing on 
> his legal obligation to pay income taxes. (cites omitted) Unless the 
> defendant can establish that he is NOT a citizen of the United States, 
> the IRS possesses authority to attempt to determine his federal tax 
> liability."
> Notice the last sentence, and also, they can only attempt on a U.S. 
> citizen. Now to the other case which is an Appeal in the Seventh Circuit 
> and she lost;
> Rachel Templeton v Internal Revenue Service, 86-1363 on appeal from 85 C 
> 457.
> "Finally, we address Templeton's second argument in which she claims 
> that she is not a 'person liable' or a 'taxpayer', as those terms are 
> defined by the Internal Revenue Code and the relevant case law, and as a 
> result that the provisions of section 6103 do not apply in her case. We 
> agree with the district court that this claim is patently frivolous. As 
> Templeton does NOT dispute that she is a citizen of the United States, 
> and because the Code imposes an income tax on `every individual who is a 
> citizen or resident of the United States,' 26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.1-(1) (a) 
> (1985), it would clearly contradict the 'plain meaning' of the term to 
> conclude that Congress did not intend that Templeton be considered a 
> 'taxpayer' as the term is used throughout the Code."
> In both cases the people claimed to be citizens of (belonging to) the 
> United States, so the tribunals were absolutely right in their 
> determinations because they fell under 26 Sec. 1 in USC and CFR. Most 
> certainly they consented to the jurisdiction in question. Argue against 
> their codes as mightily as you want, it matters not. They joined the 
> insurance club as Spooner stated, didn't they?
> I don't know how much plainer it can get. That is why I published the 
> fact that "in law" person, resident, and individual are all artificial 
> entities. They are working a fiction of law because you fell right into 
> legal terminology while NOT, in your mind, thinking the "legal" 
> definitions applied to these terms. You helped put the nail in your own 
> coffin so to speak, by helping the fiction of law prevail against you. 
> So all the law that you use as a defense is for naught. As evidenced 
> from the Slater and Templeton case, this is exactly what has happened 
> all across this country in every court case before that time, (look at 
> the Cook v Tate Case) and every case after that. Now you can appreciate 
> why you lose by this definition statement to wit;
> " a fiction is defined as a false averment on the part of the Plaintiff 
> which the defendant is not allowed to traverse, the object being to give 
> the court jurisdiction. Black's Law Dictionary 3rd Ed. (1969) Pg. 468; 
> In the case of "Willful failure to File," the Plaintiff and court 
> invents the "fiction" that defendant is a "taxpayer", A.K.A. "Person."  
> Motions and briefs which rely on precepts of law will thereafter be 
> denied or found frivolous."
> Now, this is not a false averment on the Plaintiff because YOU created 
> the fiction of law either by your actions, or inactions in denying that, 
> you are a registered voter; a resident of a State; a person, a 
> individual; a member of a State; a citizen of a State; a United States 
> citizen; that your constitution is designed to protect you, OR, claiming 
> that you are a sovereign citizen. Use any of these and you, not them, 
> are operating a fiction of law. Do you think they are going to tell you 
> all these things? NO!
> So let me play devil's advocate. If you are a "Sovereign citizen" and 
> claim they are your servants, you are supposed to know all the law that 
> your servants are to use and you would not use any of the terms listed 
> in the above paragraph. So why do you use those terms? Using these terms 
> proves that sovereign citizen is truly an oxymoron as I have always 
> stated. The reason is, sovereign is the opposite of citizen. This is 
> what the masses and the most educated so called "patriot" cannot fathom 
> because of the fraud and deceit placed upon you since childhood. You 
> carry the fraud with you to your grave and in doing so pass it on to 
> your children so everyone believes there is this thing called sovereign 
> citizen. Why people cannot think for themselves is beyond me. All one 
> has to do is research the word citizen to see he is under a legal 
> disability, while Sovereign is not under any legal disability. The 
> equivalent, respectively, are prose/pro per and sui juris. Legal terms 
> are not common terms and are drafted to deceive.
> So who is working a fiction of law that will never allow you to prevail? 
> It is not the government. It is you. The government courts are only 
> following the law and what you say. Place yourself as the judge and you 
> know the "legal terms" that apply in court. You are bound by oath to 
> give justice. A man comes before you and claims he is a "person", only 
> not one liable to pay a income tax. He also claims he is a sovereign 
> citizen of the State of So & So. He brings in the argument that there is 
> no statute stating he is required to file an income tax form or pay a 
> tax. Knowing he has just stated Fictions of law, you have to rule by the 
> law. The law says person liable. He stated he was a person. Since this 
> "person" has received a transfer over a certain sum of debt obligations, 
> he, is made liable for the use and transfer of these debt obligations, 
> see 'Use and Transfer' and 'Is this what makes you liable', on 
> atgpress.com. This man did all the work for you in presenting all the 
> fictions of Law to convict him. You, as a judge cannot rule against the 
> law. See my point? Well this concludes another facet of our problem. Not 
> one single argument will win, but this is as close as you are going to 
> get. All the articles on www.atgpress.com/ <http://www.atgpress.com/> 
> dovetail to make a neat package. I give this freely so that YOU, and no 
> one else, can make the decision that I am lying or telling the truth. As 
> I say, check my information out and everyone that states it is wrong. 
> Leave no stone unturned, as you are the one that suffers, not us.
> Sincerely,
> The Informer
> Henry K van Eyken wrote:
> >We bandy about the word "democracy" a lot, blissfully unaware of the
> >fact that it comes in many flavors. And qualities. A new book reviewed
> >by The Economist claims that "democracy and liberty are not the same;
> >that policymakers and the public overlook institutions and patterns of
> >behaviour that embody liberty, while exaggerating the virtues of those
> >that build democracy; and—most important—that democracy has spread so
> >far that it is now eroding liberty."
> >
> >http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=1621699
> >
> >And on another front is the looming world water shortage,
> >
> >http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1621254
> >
> >Quoting from this article, "But the United Nations complains, in a
> >report published this week, that most of the promises of action made at
> >such gatherings go unfulfilled and that politicians do not take the
> >issue seriously enough." 
> >
> >Just two issues here, one concerning our spiritual needs and another our
> >bodily needs, out of hundreds. Clearly, one can't stay abreast of
> >important strains of thought in an ever-complexing society without the
> >assistance of digital tools. Which brings up the question, what kind(s)
> >of digital tools? And what changes will they permit in the manner of
> >developing our thoughts and human-values-oriented discussions?
> >
> >And on the subject of values, prominent among the arguments for war
> >against Saddam is the concern for the Iraqi people now suffering under
> >his yoke. And then, suddenly, we learn that British foreign minister
> >Jack Straw is quite content to leave the Iraqi regime in place as long
> >as the country rids itself of its WMD. How sickening the cynicism that
> >abounds.
> >
> >H.
> >
> >
> >
> >  
> >
>     (07)