[ba-ohs-talk] Fwd: Re: [PORT-L] Semantic Web --> Pragmatic Web, nominalism --> realism?
Interesting reference to Doug Engelbart's point of view here... (01)
>From: Gary Richmond <garyrichmond@RCN.COM>
>Subject: Re: [PORT-L] Semantic Web --> Pragmatic Web,
> nominalism --> realism?
>To: PORT-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>
>The expression "Pragmatic Web" came out of a series of stimulating
>discussions that Aldo de Moor and I had at ICCS 2001. I don't recall who
>mouthed the phrase first, but I always credit Aldo with it in honor of
>his lively role in those far-reaching informal inquiries. We were
>both particularly concerned with "making Peirce pragmatic" (and this
>phrase is Aldo's for certain!) by which we meant creating means for
>actually realizing the principles and practices of pragmatic inquiry at
>PORT and on the Web generally.
>
>Bernard, I think your analysis is right on target and especially in the
>Engelbartian purpose you propose for the Web, namely, "social knowledge
>augmentation." I think that in this regard you are also quite right in
>stressing the importance of remembering that for Peirce information is the
>product of intension and extension "as something that appears by way of
>concrete interpretation." This is the pragmatic and creative way of
>seeing the matter, rather than imagining that information and knowledge
>are simply always already "given" merely to be better disseminated by
>a "Semantic Web." (Your analysis of "semantic" in this context also bears
>close study.)
>
>Mary, I found the reference regarding "pushing nominalism to its limits"
>leading to realism in the "preface" to The Simplest Mathematics. (Near the
>end of that preface comes your favorite Peircean characterization of
>Existential Graphs as "a moving-picture of thought..") I've appended some
>brief relevant passages from that as well as some Peirce supporting
>Bernard's analysis of the place of information in pragmatic thinking.
>
>from the "Preface" to The Simplest Mathematics.
>
>The burden of proof is undoubtedly upon the realists, because the
>nominalistic hypothesis is the simpler. Dr. Carus 3 professes himself a
>realist and yet accuses me of inconsistency in admitting Ockham's razor
>although I am a realist, thus, implying that he himself does not accept
>it. 4 But this brocard, Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem,
>that is, a hypothesis ought not to introduce complications not requisite
>to explain the facts, this is not distinctively nominalistic; it is the
>very roadbed of science. Science ought to try the simplest hypothesis
>first, with little regard to its probability or improbability, although
>regard ought to be paid to its consonance with other hypotheses, already
>accepted. This, like all the logical propositions I shall enunciate, is
>not a mere private impression of mine: it is a mathematically necessary
>deduction from unimpeachable generalizations of universally admitted facts
>of observation. The generalizations are themselves allowed by all the
>world; but still they have been submitted to the minutest criticism before
>being employed as premisses. It appears therefore that in scientific
>method the nominalists are entirely right. Everybody ought to be a
>nominalist at first, and to continue in that opinion until he is driven
>out of it by the force majeure of irreconcilable facts. Still he ought to
>be all the time on the lookout for these facts, considering how many other
>powerful minds have found themselves compelled to come over to realism.
>[emphasis added by me]
>Peirce: CP 4.1 Cross-Ref:
> . . .[A]s for the average nominalist whom you meet in the streets, he
> reminds me of the blind spot on the retina, so wonderfully does he
> unconsciously smooth over his field of vision and omit facts that stare
> him in the face, while seeing all round them without perceiving any gap
> in his view of the world. That any man not demented should be a realist
> is something he cannot conceive.
>Peirce: CP 4.1 Cross-Ref:
> My plan for defeating nominalism is not simple nor direct; but it
> seems to me sure to be decisive, and to afford no difficulties except the
> mathematical toil that it requires. For as soon as you have once mounted
> the vantage-ground of the logic of relatives, which is related to
> ordinary logic precisely as the geometry of three dimensions is to the
> geometry of points on a line, as soon as you have scaled this height, I
> say, you find that you command the whole citadel of nominalism, which
> must thereupon fall almost without another blow.
>
>
>from the "Propositions" chapter of General and Historical Survey of Logic
>
>The other divisions of terms, propositions, and arguments arise from the
>distinction of extension and comprehension. I propose to treat this
>subject in a subsequent paper. 1 But I will so far anticipate that as to
>say that there is, first, the direct reference of a symbol to its objects,
>or its denotation; second, the reference of the symbol to its ground,
>through its object, that is, its reference to the common characters of its
>objects, or its connotation; and third, its reference to its interpretants
>through its object, that is, its reference to all the synthetical
>propositions in which its objects in common are subject or predicate, and
>this I term the information it embodies . And as every addition to what it
>denotes, or to what it connotes, is effected by means of a distinct
>proposition of this kind, it follows that the extension and comprehension
>of a term are in an inverse relation, as long as the information remains
>the same, and that every increase of information is accompanied by an
>increase of one or other of these two quantities. It may be observed that
>extension and comprehension are very often taken in other senses in which
>this last proposition is not true. from "On a New List of Categories"
>[emphasis added by me]
>
>
>
>
>Bernard Morand wrote:
>>
>>A 09:50 16/11/01 -0800, Mary Keeler wrote :
>>>How disappointed Peirce would have been by what occurred in that century
>>>after his death in 1914. But Gary offers a fine suggestion. Why don't
>>>we work to create the Pragmatic Web, and aim toward where the Semantic
>>>Web must evolve? That will take more than the technological invention
>>>called "knowledge processing," and will require us to understand its
>>>nominalist roots (at the heart of Semantic Web development). Much of
>>>Peirce's work concerns the "metaphysical problem" that science as well
>>>as philosophy are nominalistic, and he says (somewhere) that the best
>>>way to become a realist is by pushing nominalism to its limits? I'll
>>>find that reference, but meantime:
>>I like that Mary ! Semantic is not a word that one can find in CSP works.
>>But this is not a mere matter of words. I think that we need a clear
>>understanding of : 1- What is the Web in itself : a technology 2- What is
>>its actual use : information by bringing people together 3- What would
>>have to be its purpose in the long run : social knowledge augmentation
>>Then, "semantic" is quite misleading for the all three questions
>>(supposing that they are accepted as such by everyone). In fact, it
>>sounds to me as if information and knowledge were already made contents.
>>Contents that technology would have to make available (easily, user
>>friendly...and so on). May be that other points of view can exist. But
>>the word semantic is the brother of information retrieval, information
>>extraction and so on. On the contrary I think that Information is
>>something that appears by way of concrete interpretations (a P RODUCT of
>>intension with extension according to Peirce) and I cannot think that it
>>could be some content of any message. The same goes for knowledge. I
>>admit that to make such distinctions does not tell us a method of
>>working. But as told by a joker : "We have first to have a look upon
>>where we don't want to go, because where we are going to, we will already
>>know it when we will be there". Regards Bernard Regards
>>Bernard
>>__________________________________________________________________
>>Bernard Morand Département Informatique Institut Universitaire de
>>Technologie BP53 14123 Ifs Cedex France TEL (33) 02 31 52 55
>>34 FAX (33) 02 31 52 55 22 e-mail:
>><mailto:morand@iutc3.unicaen.fr>morand@iutc3.unicaen.fr
>>http://www.iutc3.unicaen.fr/~moranb/ ___________________
>>_______________________________________________ (02)