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Re: [ba-unrev-talk] Connecting the Dots...



Hi Eric!    (01)

Eric Armstrong wrote:
> The *real* case has yet to be made in public, at
> least in any totally convincingly fashion.  It
> suddenly occurs to me that I may be able to do so
> here.    (02)

Not sure what the formalism you use is. Is this somehow related to IBIS' 
question-idea-argument system? I'll try to reply that way (the 
discussion seems hard to keep track of already).    (03)

If people agree, we could try to keep the numbering across emails, so 
that it's easier to refer to the different issues raised?    (04)

> Subject: Saddam Hussein
> 
> Item: If he has used biological and chemical weapons
>       on the Kurds, why would he care if someone used
>       them on us? (It's hard to see why he would.)    (05)

1. Question: Is Hussein likely to support/be indifferent about/be 
opposed to biological or chemical weapons being used on the US?    (06)

1.1. Idea: He is not likely to be opposed to it.    (07)

1.1.1. Pro-Argument [Eric's]: He has used biological and chemical 
weapons on the Kurds. It is hard to see why he would care about them 
being used on the United States.    (08)

This argument makes sense to me.    (09)

> Item: Since he has given $5,000 to the families of
>       Palestinian suicide bombers, he obviously has no
>       ethical or moral objections to activities of that
>       kind.    (010)

2. Question: Is Hussein likely to support/be indifferent about/be 
opposed to suicide attacks?    (011)

2.1. Idea: He will not have ethical or moral objections to that.    (012)

2.1.1. Pro-Argument [Eric's]: He has given $5,000 to the families of 
Palestinian suicide bombers. He would not have done that if he had 
ethical or moral objections to this kind of activity.    (013)

> Item: The blockade and limits on oil sales have left
>       him impoverished, on a "tight budget".
> 
> Item: Al Queda, though impaired, most likely still has
>       somewhere between hundreds of millions and billions
>       to spend.
> 
> Item: Given that combination of circumstances, would 
>       Hussein be reluctant to sell chemical or biological
>       weapons to Al Queda. (Why would he?)    (014)

3. Question: Would Hussein sell chemical or biological weapons to al-Qaeda?    (015)

3.1. Idea: No, he would have moral objections to the use of these kinds 
of weapons on Americans.    (016)

3.1.1. Con-Argument [Eric's]: He has used them on the Kurds, why would 
he have a problem with using them on Americans? (See Question 1.)    (017)

3.1.2. Con-Argument [Benja's]: He has produced them before. Why produce 
them if he has moral objections to them being used?    (018)

3.2. Idea: No, he would have moral objections about al-Qaeda using them 
in suicide attacks.    (019)

3.2.1. Con-Argument [Eric's]: He has given $5,000 to the families of 
Palestinian suicide bombers. (See Question 2.)    (020)

3.3. Idea: Yes, he would.    (021)

3.3.1. Pro-Argument [Eric's]: After the blockade and limits on oil 
sales, he is impoverished, on a "tight budget." He could use the money.    (022)

3.4. Idea: No, he would not work together with al-Qaeda.    (023)

3.4.1. Pro-Argument [Benja's]: He does not like al-Qaeda any more than 
al-Qaeda likes him.    (024)

3.4.2. Pro-Argument [Benja's]: There is no proof that Hussein has or has 
had contacts to al-Qaeda. (There was a report of a meeting between an 
al-Qaeda and an Iraqui agent in Prague, but this has since found to be 
fake.)    (025)

3.4.3. Pro-Argument [Benja's]: He is slowly taking steps towards 
fulfilling the international demands. (His government is granting the UN 
inspectors more rights than in 1998, and he has started destroying the 
missiles the inspectors found.) He most likely does this in the hope to 
evade a war against the US. Why would he make war almost inevitable by 
selling weapons to al-Qaeda?    (026)

3.4.4. Pro-Argument [Benja's]: Strengthening al-Qaeda would endanger his 
own position as a secular ruler. What guarantee does he have that 
al-Qaeda does not use the weapons against *him*?    (027)

3.5. Idea: The situation would not arise because al-Qaeda would not work 
together with Hussein.    (028)

3.5.1. Pro-Argument [Benja's]: Bin Laden has personally attacked Hussein 
before. He has a great dislike for the secular leader. Why support him 
with money?    (029)

3.5.2. Pro-Argument [Benja's]: Given that al-Qaeda is opposed to the 
Iraqi regime, why not buy weapons from someone else? (Atomic weapons 
from North Korea, say?)    (030)

3.6. Idea: The situation would not arise because al-Qaeda does not have 
the money.    (031)

3.6.1. Con-Argument [Eric's]: Al Queda, though impaired, most likely 
still has somewhere between hundreds of millions and billions to spend.    (032)

4. Question (challenges 3.6.1): Does al-Qaeda still have enough money to 
spend to buy Iraqi weapons?    (033)

4.1. Most likely.    (034)

(Eric, can you please back this up with arguments?)    (035)

> Item: If Al Queda had them, would they be reluctant to use
>       them? (Experience suggests the answer is "No".)    (036)

Should we put this into a question? I don't think there's disagreement 
on this.    (037)

> If so, then what is the proper and/or viable U.S. response?
> There are several possibilities:    (038)

5. Question: How should the USA respond to the threat of Saddam Hussein 
selling B or C weapons to al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda using them against the US?    (039)

>    1) Maintain the status quo, and simply hope that it never 
>       happens. Try to plug that sieve that is our open 
>       borders (which we would ideally like to *leave* open,
>       and attempt to put a cordon around every possible target,
>       for an indefinite period of time. 
> 
>       Feasibility: Unlikely. While it is relatively plausible 
>       to contain a geo-political entity, it is virtually
>       impossible to contain an organization that is not
>       geographically-limited.    (040)

5.1. Idea: Do nothing. Maintain the status quo, and simply hope that it 
never happens.    (041)

5.2. Idea: Try to plug its open borders, and attempt to put a cordon 
around every possible target, for an indefinite period of time.    (042)

5.2.1. Con-Argument [Eric's]: Unlikely to work. While it is relatively 
plausible  to contain a geo-political entity, it is virtually impossible 
to contain an organization that is not geographically-limited.    (043)

>    2) Relax the economic sanctions, back away, and remove the
>       pressure to sell such weapons.
> 
>       Feasibility: Unlikely. Kuwait becomes an Iraqi province.
>       In all probability, the strategy of appeasement will work
>       no better than it did prior to WWII.    (044)

5.3. Idea: Relax the economic sanctions to remove the pressure to sell 
such weapons.    (045)

5.3.1. Con-Argument [Eric's]: Unlikely to work. Kuwait ['is now 
becoming' or 'would be becoming'? -b] an Iraqi province. In all 
probability, the strategy of appeasement will work no better than it did 
prior to WWII.    (046)

>    3) Change the game.
>       Achieve regime change.
> 
>       Feasibility: Doable. Likely to stabilize the middle east.    (047)

5.4. Idea: Archieve regime change by going to war.    (048)

5.4.1. Pro-Argument [Eric's]: Doable.    (049)

5.4.2. Pro-Argument [Eric's]: Likely to stabilize the middle east.    (050)

5.4.3. Con-Argument [John Sechrest's]: The US is not the policeman of 
the world. They do not have the right to attack Iraq.    (051)

Follow-up coming, so much for now. I'm new to IBIS, so please point out 
my mistakes :)    (052)

- Benja    (053)